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Whither Chevron? 1 For several years, some justices of the
Supreme Court have been questioning Chevron deference, partly on the

1.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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basis of my constitutional critique of it. 2 It was inevitable that someone
would stand up in defense of that doctrine, and I am glad to say that
my estimable former colleague Jonathan Siegel has stepped up to the
plate. 3 But the defense of the indefensible is not easy.
Although the long-standing conventional critique of Chevron
was that it violates the separation of powers and federalism, my
criticism is that Chevron deference corrupts the judicial process. As
adumbrated in my 2014 book Is Administrative Law Unlawful? and
developed in an article Chevron Bias, the constitutional problem with
Chevron deference is twofold: its departure from independent judgment
and its embrace of judicial bias. 4
First, Chevron requires judges to abandon their duty of
independent judgment. Judges have an office of judgment—an office in
which they have a duty to exercise their own independent judgment in
the cases that come before them. 5 This is implicit in the very concept of
a court with judges established by Article III. 6 As John Marshall
famously said in Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 7
Nonetheless, in asking judges to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes, Chevron demands that judges abandon their independent
judgment about what the law is.
Second, where the government is a party to a case, Chevron
requires judges to favor the government’s interpretation. 8 That is, it
asks judges to be systematically biased in favor of the legal position of
one of the parties—the most powerful of parties—in violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s due process of law. 9 The courts themselves thus
stand accused.
Since 2014, at least the first of these arguments has found its
way into the opinions of two Supreme Court justices. Justice Thomas
and Justice Gorsuch (while on the Tenth Circuit) have taken the view
that Chevron is incompatible with a judge’s independent judgment. 10
2.
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 314–15 (2014); Philip
Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016)
3.
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937
(2018).
4.
HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 314–15; Hamburger, supra note 2.
5.
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 1189.
6.
Id.
7.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
8.
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 1189.
9.
Id.
10. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (partly quoting Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217); Guitierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (10th Cir. 2016).
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Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently discarded its
Chevron-style deference on grounds of both independent judgment and
judicial bias. 11 Indeed, the Wisconsin court challenged the U.S.
Supreme Court to follow suit with the reminder that “[t]he abdication
of core judicial power to the executive is a concern not just of our court,
but of the federal judiciary as well.” 12 The dual critiques of Chevron are
thus taking a toll.
Siegel is therefore justified in thinking that Chevron is at risk.
But can Chevron really be propped up? Consider Siegel’s four
arguments, and then, fifth, the costs of his proposed volte-face.
I. CHEVRON LEAVES ROOM FOR SOME JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Siegel’s first argument is that Chevron does not entirely bar
judges from interpreting. 13 His argument is that judges acting under
Chevron merely recognize that some statutes vest decisionmaking
power in an agency, and that once Chevron is understood this way, it
becomes clear that the case “does not prevent a court from interpreting
statutes.” 14 On this basis, Siegel concludes that Chevron does not
require judges to give up their independent judgment or otherwise
“shirk” their duty. 15
But this misses the point. Of course, judges under Chevron still
interpret; Chevron explicitly requires them to interpret statutes on
questions of rulemaking authority. The problem is that after the judges
interpret those questions—on the authority of agencies to make rules
interpreting statutes—they often feel compelled by Chevron to defer to
the agencies’ interpretation of the substance of the statutes. To say that
judges interpret the shell while deferring to agencies about the meat
inside actually makes my point: Chevron requires judges on some
issues—the central ones—to give up their independent judgment and
be biased in favor of one of the parties.
If judges have a duty to exercise their own independent
judgment about what the law is, they cannot defer to the judgments of
agencies on any issues, let alone those that are most substantive. And
if judges have a duty to avoid being systematically biased in their
decisions—as is clear from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due
process—then in cases in which the government is a party, they cannot

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2018).
Id. at 46.
Siegel, supra note 3, at 942.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 956.
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defer to any agency interpretations, as this would be systematic bias in
favor of one party’s legal position.
These problems do not go away just because the judges engage
in some initial interpretation about the authority of agencies. Even if
the judges engage in independent judgment and avoid bias on one issue,
this does not excuse them from living up to such standards on other
issues—indeed, on the statutory meat.
II. CHEVRON IS JUSTIFIABLE WITH A “CONCEPTUAL SHIFT” FROM
INTERPRETATION TO LAWMAKING
Siegel’s second move is to try to recast Chevron away from
interpretation. As he puts it, his argument “require[s] a conceptual shift
in the understanding of the kind of discretion conferred on an
administrative agency by an ambiguous statute.” 16 To be precise, he
thinks that Chevron should be understood to concern delegated policy
choices rather than statutory interpretation. On this basis, he concludes
that when judges defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes
under Chevron, they are not really refusing to interpret, but rather are
recognizing that the statutes are giving agencies something akin to
legislative power.
Chevron, however, notoriously takes a dual vision of what
agencies are doing. 17 On the one hand, the case recognizes the reality
that the agencies, in their Chevron-justified rules, are making law. On
the other hand, the case relies on a theory of interpretation to justify
such rulemaking.
That Chevron at least involves interpretation is abundantly
clear from the opinion. A key paragraph in the decision begins by
discussing statutes that expressly delegate rulemaking authority; but
rather than say that they involve policy choices or legislation, the
paragraph says that they “express[ly] delegat[e] . . . authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” 18
That is, to justify Chevron, the paragraph starts by suggesting that
agencies merely elucidate or interpret such statutes. Only then, the
paragraph turns to statutes that do not obviously authorize
rulemaking, and it concludes that “a court may not substitute its own
construction . . . for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.” 19 In short, Chevron bluntly justifies what
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 942.
Hamburger, supra note 2, at 1220–23.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
Id.
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it is doing in terms of interpretation. And to this end, it even begins by
recasting statutes that expressly authorize rulemaking to suggest that
they are really authorizing interpretation!
Why does Chevron simultaneously recognize the reality of
agency lawmaking and yet rely on a theory of interpretation? Some
authorizing statutes actually state that the authorized agency may
make rules, and other authorizing statutes do not say this. Against this
backdrop, it is difficult to conclude that the silent statutes are
authorizing rulemaking, unless one takes for granted that such statutes
assume agencies must interpret the statutes in order to carry them out.
It is thus no accident that Chevron relies on a theory of interpretation.
In the absence of express statutory authorization to make rules, the
justices in Chevron could not have easily reached their conclusions
without arguing that statutory indeterminacy is an invitation to
agencies to interpret and that judges, in their interpretation of the
statute, must ordinarily defer to the agencies’ interpretations.
And it is not just Chevron, for that case has a context. As Siegel
himself concedes, “the question of the degree of respect to be given by
courts to an agency’s interpretation of a statute ‘produced a large
number of statutory interpretation opinions that defy easy
reconciliation.’ ” 20 Indeed, “as late as 1983—just a year before
Chevron—the Court reiterated the view that an agency’s interpretation,
though entitled to respect, was not controlling.” 21 And, since then,
numerous cases have developed and expanded upon Chevron’s
approach to agency interpretations. Chevron, in other words, does not
stand alone; it is one of many cases, spanning many decades, on judicial
deference to agency interpretation.
Accordingly, if Chevron does not concern interpretation, what is
to be said of the myriad other cases? Put another way, what is to be said
about the cognate doctrines such as Auer and Mead-Skidmore, let alone
Brown & Williamson, Brand X, and Arlington? 22 And if those cases and
doctrines concededly involve interpretation—indeed, in some instances,
necessarily involve interpretation—why is Chevron an outlier? One
cannot deny that Chevron concerns interpretation without also denying
the role of interpretation elsewhere. Siegel’s reconceptualization of
Chevron thus denies something central about both the case and its
jurisprudential context.
20. Siegel, supra note 3, at 944.
21. Id.
22. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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To suggest that Chevron does not concern agency interpretation
is as one-sided as it would be to suggest that it does not concern agency
policymaking. To understand this, consider an analogy to judicial
lawmaking. As I wrote in “Chevron Bias,” “[i]t is widely recognized that
judges often use their interpretation as a mode of lawmaking. It would
be a gross overstatement, however, to conclude from this that judicial
interpretation is not at all interpretation—that it is merely
lawmaking.” 23 Similarly, it is gross overstatement to take the reality of
agency policymaking under Chevron to mean that there is no agency
interpretation. That is simply wrong.
III. STATUTES THAT SAY NOTHING ABOUT AUTHORIZING RULEMAKING
ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS STATUTES THAT SAY THEY ARE
AUTHORIZING RULEMAKING
Chevron is based on the contrast between statutes that allegedly
authorize rulemaking through mere ambiguity and those that expressly
authorize rulemaking. Nonetheless, Siegel urges that “policymaking
power conferred by statutory ambiguity is no different than
policymaking power conferred by express statutory language.” 24 As he
elaborates, “an ambiguous agency statute is simply another way of
doing something that Congress does all the time—namely, authorize an
agency to make a policy choice.” 25 Siegel is correct that many statutes
expressly authorize rulemaking, but that is precisely what the statutes
involved in Chevron do not do.
Siegel brushes this aside by arguing: “If Congress can delegate
power to administrative agencies to make policy decisions, the precise
form that the delegation takes should be of little importance.” 26 But the
form matters. One sort of statute authorizes rulemaking; the other does
not. This is why Chevron focuses on interpretation. To avoid resting on
a theory of interpretation, Chevron would have had to ignore the
difference between statutes that say agencies may make rules and those
that do not. Of course, an academic can blithely ignore this difference,
but a court cannot.
Siegel’s suggestion that Chevron can be justified by simply
assimilating two distinct types of statutes, as if Congress’s
authorization of rulemaking did not make a difference, is a reminder of
how much Chevron is a judicial creation—a deliberate judicial effort to
23.
24.
25.
26.

Hamburger, supra note 2, at 1223.
Siegel, supra note 3, at 942.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 961.
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expand the administrative state. Exactly why the judiciary for more
than a century has repeatedly upheld this unconstitutional mode of
governance is too broad a topic to be explored here. But at least in most
of its administrative cases, the Supreme Court was merely upholding
unconstitutional ventures initiated by Congress. In contrast, in
Chevron, the Court itself took the initiative. Rather than merely defend
the indefensible, it went out of its way to expand the administrative
state.
And the Court did this precisely by playing upon the difference
between statutes that expressly authorize rulemaking authorization
and those that do not. 27 The only way the Court could extract
rulemaking authority out of statutes that were silent about it was to
suggest that statutory ambiguity constituted authorization to agencies
to resolve the ambiguity, which is exactly the sort of argument that is
not necessary when statutes expressly authorize rulemaking. It is
therefore difficult to justify Chevron by blurring the difference between
statutes with express rulemaking authorization and those without it,
for the logic of Chevron actually rests on the difference.
Of course, having played upon the difference between the two
sorts of statutes, one might want to cover one’s tracks by suggesting
that there is little significant difference between them. Recall that the
Court in Chevron did this by suggesting that both sorts of statutes
authorize interpretation. 28 Now that judicial deference to such
interpretation looks unconstitutional, Siegel takes the opposite view:
that both sorts of statutes authorize rulemaking, not interpretation.
Either way, Chevron fundamentally rests on the difference
between the two types of statutes. If there were no basic difference
between statutes containing words authorizing rulemaking and
statutes without such words, then there would have been no need for
the Chevron doctrine. It is therefore nearly comic—in fact, rather
unreal—to attempt to escape Chevron’s constitutional problems by
assimilating the two sorts of statutes.

27. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (“If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”)
28. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
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A. Imaginary Chevron Statute
Siegel is particularly inventive when he imagines a Chevron
Implementation Statute, which would expressly authorize agencies to
make rules in circumstances in which Chevron currently allows them
to do so. 29 He carefully frames his hypothetical statute to authorize
agencies to make policy choices rather than interpretations—as he puts
it, the statute “does not authorize the agency to interpret an ambiguous
agency statute,” in the sense of giving an authoritative or binding
interpretation of it. 30 The effect is to suggest that the statutes subject
to Chevron are analogous to express statutory authorization for
rulemaking, and that Chevron can be reconceptualized to avoid having
anything to do with interpretation. 31
But, lo and behold, Siegel could not draft his statute without
framing it in terms of interpretation:
Any provision of a statute that is administered by an agency and that is susceptible of
more than one reasonable interpretation shall be deemed to set out the provision’s
possible, reasonable interpretations as permitted alternatives and to authorize and direct
the agency to choose and implement one of the permitted alternatives. 32

Like a magician making a body disappear, Siegel proclaims that this
imaginary statute does “not confer interpretive power on agencies.” And
he is right. With sufficient deftness, one could draft an authorizing
statute that produces the same results as Chevron without giving
agencies a power to interpret.
As with the magician, however, Siegel’s statute has not really
made interpretation disappear. Even Siegel could not draft his statute
without twice mentioning interpretation, for in order to mimic Chevron
he had to use the notion of interpretation to define the scope of agency
legislation. The cleverness is in the illusion, not the reality.
Interpretation does not really go away.
To this, one must add the obvious: Congress has not adopted
Siegel’s statute. Nor would it. If Congress had wanted to confer
rulemaking authority on agencies, it would have simply said so. Which
is exactly what it has not done.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Siegel, supra note 3, at 974.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 974.
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IV. CONGRESS CAN INSTRUCT COURTS HOW TO INTERPRET ITS
STATUTES
Last but not least, Siegel argues that “Congress may prescribe
rules of interpretation for the statutes it passes.” 33 Indeed, he declares
that, “[l]ike any giver of instructions, Congress may say how its
instructions are to be understood.” 34 Really?
A. Control over Interpretation Is Control over the Judiciary
If Congress could instruct the courts on how its words are to be
understood, what would be the implications for the courts? In a
profound work of political theory—Through the Looking-Glass—
Humpty Dumpty tells Alice:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what
I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you
can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty,
“which is to be master—that’s all.” 35

Congressional control over Congress’s words would make Congress
master—not only over lawmaking, but also over judging. And this is
improbable, as the judicial power belongs to the courts, which form an
independent branch of government.
Of course, as will be seen shortly, Congress can define its words
so as to clarify its intent, but this is a far cry from dictating how they
are to be understood or interpreted. That is a judgment which belongs
to the judges, and any congressional attempt to control that judgment
would defeat the independence of the judiciary in its own sphere of
power: the decision of cases. Thus, even before one gets to question of
judicial office and duty, Siegel’s claim that Congress can control the
understanding of its words collides with the Constitution’s structure of
the federal government—in particular, its creation of courts
independent of the other branches.

33. Id. at 942.
34. Id. Incidentally, Siegel’s suggestion that Congress is like any other “giver of instructions”
is not persuasive, for the ultimate “giver of instructions” in the government of the United States
is the people, who have used their constitution to give judicial power, including the interpretation
of law in cases, to the courts. U.S. CONST., art. III. Congress is thus not like any other “giver of
instructions.” See id.
35. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKINGGLASS 124 (The Macmillan Co. 1930) (1871).
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B. Judicial Duty
If the Constitution vests judicial power in the courts, and if
judicial interpretation is part of that power, how can Congress instruct
the courts on how to exercise it? It is one thing to conclude that, in most
instances, Congress can withdraw cases from the jurisdiction of the
courts, but it is quite another to suggest that, where Congress leaves
jurisdiction in the courts, it can bar courts and their judges from
exercising their own independent judgment about what the law is.
The judges have a distinctive office of exercising their own
independent judgment in cases. Of course, other federal officers can and
should exercise their judgment about the law, but the judges stand
apart as the only federal officers whose very office is one of judgment—
indeed, independent judgment—in the resolution of cases. 36
Accordingly, when a case comes before them, they have a duty, inherent
in their very identity as judges, to exercise their own independent
judgment about what the law is. John Marshall’s words, again, are
illuminating: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.” 37
Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how Congress, even in
a statute, can dictate to the judges how they should interpret statutes.
Such a statute would be incompatible with their duty to exercise their
own independent judgment. Were they to follow Congress’s
instructions, they would be neither exercising their own judgment nor
preserving its independence.
C. Chevron Is Not Like the Constitution’s Allocation of Power to Other
Branches
In defending congressional interference with the judges’
constitutional duty, Siegel argues that Chevron is akin to the cases in
which the Supreme Court recognizes that the Constitution limits the
power of the courts. To be precise, he relies on cases holding that at
least some questions about the meaning of the Census Clause and the
Apportionment Clause can be resolved by Congress. 38
But the clauses relied upon by Siegel are instances in which the
Constitution itself is said to shift judicial power away from judges—not
cases in which Congress takes such authority from judges. The
Constitution vests the judicial power in the courts, including the duty
36. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 316, 545–46, 612–13 (2008).
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
38. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 966–71; See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Utah v. Evans, 536
U.S. 452 (2002); U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)).
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in cases to say what the law is—subject to some variations stated in the
Constitution itself. 39 Put another way, the Constitution’s separation of
powers is a default rule, from which the Constitution makes some
exceptions. 40 But it does not follow that mere statutes can also make
exceptions. Constitutional exceptions from the Constitution’s
separation of powers are no justification for statutory exceptions.
D. Definitional and Liberal-Construction Clauses
Along the way, Siegel relies on the clauses of statutes that define
their terms or that say they should be liberally construed. 41 But it does
not follow that Congress can instruct courts to defer to agency
interpretations of their ambiguous authorizing statutes.
The statutory definitions are drafting mechanisms for
demarcating the contours of statutorily created powers and duties.
They are more clearly indications of congressional intent or meaning
than instructions to judges about interpretation.
As for the statutes that say that they should be liberally
construed to effectuate their purposes, such provisions may indeed be
congressional instructions about interpretation. But it is therefore
telling that Siegel cites only one Supreme Court case (on RICO) for the
legitimacy of such provisions. 42 And as might be expected, the Court in
that case did not entirely rely on the liberal construction provision.
Instead, it rested its “less restrictive reading” on its “prior cases and the
general principles surrounding this statute,” on “Congress’ selfconsciously expansive language and overall approach,” and only third
on Congress’s “express admonition that RICO is to ‘be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ” 43 This is hardly strong
support for a broad claim that Congress can instruct judges on
interpretation
Stepping back from Siegel’s arguments, it is worth noting that
the question of whether Congress can instruct the courts on
interpretation is much disputed. The conventional answer is that a
congressional power to dictate interpretation would interfere with the
judicial power and independence of the courts, and with the duty of
39. U.S. CONST. art. III.
40. HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 331–32 (explaining the eighteenth-century view that a
constitution should establish the separation of powers as a default rule, from which it then could
carve out exceptions).
41. Siegel, supra note 3, at 977.
42. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497–98 (1985); Siegel, supra note 3, at 976 (citing
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1457, 1502 n.228 (2000)).
43. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497–98.
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judges to exercise independent judgment. Another view, however, has
developed to the effect that Congress can at least dictate to the courts
how they should interpret statutes—this being the position adopted by
Siegel. But “the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”
cannot be sliced and diced to separate statutes from the Constitution;
in other words, it cannot be narrowed to apply only when judges
interpret the Constitution. 44 Such an approach would deprive the courts
of their independence in expounding the law, except in constitutional
matters. Were Congress thereby to become the interpreter of its own
statutes, the consequences for the courts and for the people of the
United States would be sobering. Siegel’s essay, however, discusses
none of this.
Congress’s role in interpretation need not be pursued here.
Suffice it to say that, although Congress can clarify what it intends or
means, it does not necessarily follow that Congress can instruct courts
on how to interpret statutes, and Siegel’s reliance on the one point to
prove the other suggests just how far he is stretching to defend
Chevron. 45
V. THE COST OF A VOLTE-FACE
Thus far, I have simply recited Siegel’s four arguments and
questioned their intellectual force; it therefore remains necessary to
consider their political costs. Siegel’s vision of how to prop up Chevron
would require the Supreme Court to overturn a vast body of case law—
both on delegation and on interpretation. And this is no small matter.
Leaving aside that this volte-face would require a profound intellectual
disjuncture, it would come with risks for the Court and the country.
A. Nondelegation Doctrine
Siegel’s policymaking vision of Chevron would require a reversal
of the “nondelegation doctrine.” As Cass Sunstein has observed, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress may not delegate
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
45. Incidentally, Siegel also claims that “courts have a duty, where possible, to construe
statutes in a way that saves their constitutionality, even deeming the statutes to be rewritten in
different language where necessary.” Siegel, supra note 3, at 980. But this grossly misstates the
doctrine of equitable interpretation, for it does not adequately recognize the precondition for the
doctrine in an ambiguity, its goal of discerning legislative intent, or the risks of taking it further.
(For this doctrine, see HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 54–57, 339–40, 344–57). Moreover, even if
there were such a duty, it does not mean (as Siegel assumes) that the courts would have to save
ambiguous statutes by pretending that they contained clauses authorizing rulemaking. On the
contrary, it would be much easier to save their constitutionality by just recognizing that they do
not authorize rulemaking.
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legislative power. 46 Of course, it has simultaneously allowed the reality
of delegation, but it has done so with a remarkable adherence to the
theory that legislative power cannot be delegated. So, in defense of
Chevron, should the Court candidly accept that Congress can give
legislative power to agencies? 47
Siegel sidesteps this issue by speaking of agency “policy choices”
rather than agency lawmaking. Yet he recognizes that when he speaks
of “policy choices,” he is really talking about lawmaking. 48 Whatever the
label, if Chevron is to be justified on the ground that Congress has
allocated policymaking rather than interpretation to agencies, this
would openly accept the delegation of legislative power to agencies—
something the Supreme Court has long said is unconstitutional.
B. Precedents
Siegel’s suggestion that Chevron does not concern interpretation
would also overturn a long line of cases. For more than three decades,
Supreme Court decisions have treated Chevron as involving judicial
deference to agency interpretation. For example, United States v. Mead
Corp. held that Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 49
Accordingly, if judges were to follow Siegel’s reimagination of
Chevron, they would have to reverse their longstanding understanding
of the case. I wrote in “Chevron Bias”:
The excuse that administrative interpretation is merely lawmaking . . . conflates what
the Supreme Court has persistently differentiated. If the Justices have been mistaken in
recognizing agency interpretation as interpretation, why have none of them corrected
themselves—why have none of them clarified that that it is not interpretation? And if,
after so many decades, they conclude it is not interpretation, not even partly
interpretation, let them explain why, so late in the day, they are changing their minds. In
the meantime, the insistence of a handful of academics that it is merely lawmaking looks
utterly unrealistic. 50

Perhaps the greater good of saving Chevron justifies the pretense that
it means the opposite of what it clearly says and has long been
understood to mean; but this has yet to be shown.
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000).
47. Of course, the “nondelegation doctrine” is a misnomer, as this label suggests that what is
at stake is merely a judicial doctrine rather than the Constitution itself.
48. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 960 (relying on Monaghan’s account of the “delegation of
law-making authority to an agency” as “[t]he core insight”).
49. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
50. Hamburger, supra note 2, at 1222.
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And if the Supreme Court were to defend Chevron by reversing
itself on delegation and interpretation, its decision would come with
more than trivial costs. Americans might reasonably wonder what
would justify the Court in spinning around on a dime. Indeed, they
might reasonably conclude that the Court cares more about Chevron
than about the law.
C. Fictions
Siegel appears to be calling on the Supreme Court to defend
Chevron with a legal fiction. He is no doubt sincere in seeking his
“conceptual shift”—the shift by which the Court would stop saying that
the case centers on interpretation and would say, instead, that it merely
recognizes statutory delegations of agency “policy choices” or
lawmaking. But if the justification for Chevron deference is that
statutory ambiguities need to be interpreted, what is this conceptual
shift to delegated lawmaking other than a legal fiction?
I am not the only one to express this concern. Thomas Merrill
observes: “Even Chevron’s most enthusiastic champions admit that the
idea of an ‘implied delegation’ is a fiction.” 51 And Adrian Vermeule
explains that “the delegation theory is an erroneous and insufficient
justification for Chevron, both because it is rankly fictional—there just
is no general delegation of that sort to administrative agencies—and
because the Chevron opinion itself is irreducibly ambiguous, or
ambivalent, on the topic of delegation.” 52 Siegel’s approach, in other
words, departs from the underlying statutory and judicial realities.
The sad truth is that administrative power is repeatedly
justified with what could politely be called “fictions,” but which more
bluntly look like falsehoods. Administrative power is called
“administrative law”; the delegation of lawmaking power is justified
under a “nondelegation” doctrine; agencies are said to be constrained by
statutory “intelligible principles”; administrative rulemaking with
notice and comment is said to be “democratic”; administrative
adjudicators who usurp the role of judges are called “judges”; private
claims to the Seventh Amendment jury right are defeated by the
government’s “public right”; the administrative denial of the due
process of law is justified as “all the process that is due”; even when one
gets the paltry right to a “hearing,” one does not necessarily have the

51. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 759
(2014).
52. Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1557–58 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER,
supra note 2).
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right to be heard; and so forth. Administrative power rests on one
brazen falsehood after another.
Siegel’s arguments are admirably candid. But it is therefore all
the more regrettable that they ask the Justices to prop up
administrative power with yet another fiction. Both Chevron and the
logic on which it rests involve interpretation, and if the Supreme Court
were to say otherwise, it would be as unpersuasive as it is when it
eviscerates jury rights by speaking of “public rights.”
The Supreme Court is right to be concerned about its reputation.
But a strained attempt to support an unsupportable doctrine is not the
remedy. On the contrary, that sort of tactic, even in only one prominent
case, can stimulate lasting cynicism, which may take decades to
overcome. The ideal of judging that justifies the elevated role of the
courts is one of independent judgment in accord with the law of the
land. And any departure from this ideal of office and duty is apt to
undermine confidence in the Justices and the law they are meant to
uphold.
The reality is that we have a vast administrative state, resting
on a raft of judicial falsehoods. And as these fictions are increasingly
recognized for what they are, it is not only the administrative state that
is at risk. The Justices therefore cannot afford any more fictions,
falsehoods, or whatever else one wants to call these odorous untruths.
And among these costly fictions is the “conceptual shift” that Chevron
is not about interpretation. Instead of creating more fictions, the
Justices, in accord with their duty and their institutional interests,
need to adhere to the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Although Siegel’s argument is the best that can be made for
Chevron deference, it cannot successfully prop up this doctrine. First,
his observation that Chevron allows judges to interpret questions of
agency authority is simply unresponsive to the concern that Chevron
precludes judges from interpreting the underlying substantive
questions—thereby requiring judges to abandon independent judgment
and embrace judicial bias. Second, his claim that Chevron can be
reconceptualized away from interpretation runs counter to the case, its
logic, and its context in many decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Third, he is wrong in suggesting there is no significant difference
between statutes that say they are authorizing rulemaking and those
that do not. Fourth, although Congress can clarify what it intends or
means, it does not follow that Congress can instruct courts how to
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interpret statutes, let alone bar courts from saying what the law is.
Fifth, the Supreme Court cannot afford Siegel’s proposed volte-face.
In attempting to rescue Chevron deference from its
constitutional failings, Siegel offers arguments that are not merely
unsound, but positively rickety. The impression is of a doctrine resting
precariously on narrow stilts, which cannot stand on their own but that
have been propped together to support the insupportable.
Not just a technical detail of the administrative state, Chevron
is an assault on the fundamentals of our judicial system. Recall, parties
have a right to have judges decide what the law is, and they have a right
to have judges decide this without bias toward the other party. Chevron
is therefore an abomination, by which the Justices have turned the
judiciary into an instrument of injustice.
Accordingly, rather than support Chevron on stilts, the Justices
need to return to fundamentals. They need to remember that they hold
an office of independent judgment in accord with the law of the land.
This is their duty, not the defense of an oppressive and unconstitutional
administrative state.

